

# DEFENSE & DISARMAMENT ALTERNATIVES

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## Why Is NATO Stalling?

by Randall Forsberg

For the first time since the Korean War, events in the United States, Europe, and the Soviet Union have put major arms reductions on the public agenda. In a few months the long-stalled M(B)FR [Mutual (and Balanced) Force Reduction] talks on conventional forces in Central Europe will give way to a new forum, the Conventional Stability Talks (CST). The new talks will cover all NATO and Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) ground and air forces in the region stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals.

### COMMENTARY

Though little noted in the media, the CST talks could be extremely important. At the very least, they are likely to lead to measures that will reduce the risk of surprise attack by increasing warning time. But they should aim to do more: to reduce long-term mobilization potential, severely limit offensive, cross-border capabilities, and increase openness or "transparency" in military affairs.

Most important, the talks should aim to achieve deep cuts in the large, standing armies of East and West. The forces earmarked to deter or fight another war in Europe account for two-thirds of world military spending and over half of the \$300 billion US military budget. Deep cuts in these forces could produce cuts in US military spending on the order of \$50-100 billion per year. In addition, by focusing on the deepest motive of the arms race—fear of a never-ending series of great power wars—the CST talks offer a means of building trust between East and West at the most basic level. Building trust and reducing the risk of conventional war would, in turn, remove the chief obstacles to abolishing battlefield nuclear arms and ending NATO's dangerous first-use policy.

#### Soviet Initiatives

What offers hope for real progress in the CST talks is a new approach by the Soviet Union. General Secretary Gorbachev and Defense Minister Yazov have announced a dramatic shift in Soviet conventional strategy. They are abandoning the blitzkrieg tactics with which the Soviet military intended to fight the next war on Western soil in favor of defense-oriented operations that would hold the line in the East.

Consistent with this change, at the United Nations on 7

December 1988 Gorbachev announced unilateral cuts of unprecedented scope in Soviet ground and air forces, to be made over the next two years. The USSR is also seeking rapid progress toward further, bilateral reductions in NATO and WTO ground and air forces within the framework of the CST talks. (See CONFERENCE REPORT this issue, page 3.)

In developing the CST agenda, the Soviets have proposed a four-step process. First, each side should publish detailed data on its own and the other's conventional ground and air forces. Next, both sides should cut offensively-oriented weaponry to a level below that of the side with less. Third, once NATO and the WTO have roughly comparable forces, both should make further, deep cuts involving demobilization of about 500,000 men. Finally, there should be additional cuts and radical restructuring of the remaining forces on the two sides to give them a truly nonoffensive character.

As the chief example of near-future cuts in offensively-oriented systems, the Soviets have offered to dismantle 20,000 tanks if the West will give up 1,400 attack aircraft.

#### Western Governments Stalling

Unfortunately, rather than seize the opportunity presented by the new Soviet flexibility and make a counterproposal of deep cuts in conventional forces, the governments of the United States, Britain, France, and West Germany have adopted a "damage-limiting" approach. They are trying to prevent or minimize cuts in Western nuclear and conventional forces, regardless of what the USSR does.

Some French leaders have gone so far as to argue that if the two sides did achieve a conventional "balance," this would un-

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dermine public support for the NATO strategy of threatening to use nuclear weapons in case of war.

In the Federal Republic of Germany, the Kohl administration has come up with an ingenious scheme for unilaterally placating popular antinuclear sentiment while "modernizing" battlefield and theater nuclear forces. The idea is to reduce or eliminate the 2,000 nuclear shells for howitzers; to replace the 800 Lance battlefield nuclear missiles with several hundred Lance follow-on missiles that could reach deep into Eastern Europe; and to introduce several hundred new tactical air-launched cruise missiles that could reach the USSR.

The net effect of these changes would be to reverse the effect of the INF treaty—and once again hold the USSR hostage to a nuclear attack that could be launched from West Germany—while defusing public opposition by reducing the overall number of theater nuclear weapons and shifting the locus of the threat of nuclear war from the two Germanys to Poland and the USSR. None of this need involve any negotiation or trade with the Soviets.

At a private meeting in late October, I asked a US Defense Department official whether the United States has developed a counteroffer with which to test Soviet rhetoric. He replied that in the view of the administration, the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe is their problem and they can deal with it themselves. In other words, so far the US response is no response.

#### HOW NATO-DEFINED "ATTU FORCES" DIFFER FROM "FORCES LIKELY TO BE USED IN A EUROPEAN WAR"

■ They understate Western ground and air forces by omitting US forces based in the United States that are officially earmarked for NATO use, as well as other US forces likely to be used in Europe in the event of an all-out conventional war.

■ They overstate Soviet ground and air forces by including strategic reserves deployed in the Soviet central and southern "military theaters of operation," without noting that most of these forces would not be available for use in Europe or that comparable US strategic reserves are not covered in the ATTU definition.

■ They overstate Soviet ground divisions by including, along with active and reserve divisions comparable to those in the West, Soviet "phantom" divisions. These virtually unmanned divisions, which exist solely to provide a long-term mobilization structure, have no real counterpart in the West.

■ They overstate Soviet ground armaments by counting equipment that would be considered "in storage" in the West.

■ They significantly distort tactical airpower because they include Soviet strike aircraft with naval targets which happen to be based on land because the USSR does not have aircraft carriers capable of launching and landing supersonic attack aircraft, but they exclude US strike aircraft with land-based targets in Europe which happen to be based on aircraft carriers.

#### The NATO Approach

NATO's goal for the CST talks is to preserve its long-standing military doctrine, which prescribes "forward defense" and "flexible response" (possible use of nuclear as well as conventional forces in the event of war). The Western alliance has refused to discuss further nuclear cuts in Europe; and it has struggled to focus the CST talks on the area of relative WTO strength, ground forces, while exempting NATO's areas of relative strength, naval and air forces.

Within these limits, NATO's opening CST proposal calls for "mutual" reductions in ground force personnel and weaponry in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals (ATTU) region to levels 5 percent below the current NATO ones. According to NATO estimates, this would require WTO-NATO reductions in tanks at a ratio of 27:1; in artillery pieces at 55:1; in armored personnel carriers at 27:1; and in troops at 24:1.

Buttressing this position is a new NATO report, *Conventional Forces in Europe: The Facts*, released on 25 November 1988. Rushed out to head off an overly enthusiastic public reaction to the expected Gorbachev initiative, the report gives the most lop-sided picture of the East-West conventional balance of any official document published in the last 30 years.

Rather than show forces likely to be brought to bear in the event of a major war in Europe, the NATO report covers forces on the ground in the ATTU region. Seeing newspaper accounts of the NATO report, the average Western reader will assume—falsely—that the figures cover the conventional forces on each side available at relatively short notice to be brought to bear in a major war in Europe. In reality, the NATO figures for the Soviet side cover much more, including strategic reserves, naval aircraft, and cadre or "phantom" divisions that would take months to mobilize; while on the US side they exclude strategic reserves, carrier-based aircraft, and NATO-earmarked divisions and tactical air squadrons that would enter the fray within a few days or weeks.

NATO's response to this criticism—recently voiced by one of the report's authors at an international conference in London—is that the report is not designed to give an overall force balance, but only "CST negotiating statistics."

While adhering to the letter of the CST mandate, the NATO position shamelessly violates the spirit of the new talks. Granted, the talks concern cuts to be made in the ATTU region. But no knowledgeable Western observer believes that it would make sense for the USSR militarily to equalize ground and air forces, using the NATO counting rules, within the ATTU region alone, without regard to global US and Soviet deployments.

The reason is that the ATTU region contains 75-80 percent of all Soviet ground and air forces worldwide, excluding only small strategic reserves in Siberia and other Asian regions, and forces deployed along the Chinese border. In contrast, only about 10 percent of US ground and air forces are stationed on the ground in Europe. The rest of the US forces maintained to support NATO are based at sea or back in the United States, with expensive prepositioned equipment, training, and logistical support to permit rapid convergence on Europe in the event of war. It is unreasonable to expect the USSR to cut its army west of the Urals—that is, its main military force—to a level far below what the United States and its NATO allies plan to field in Europe.

A fair basis for the new talks would be one that identifies the

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# Joint US-Soviet Seminar on Conventional Arms Reduction in Europe

*During the week 12-17 September 1988 an extraordinary series of meetings between US and Soviet arms control experts and policymakers took place in Moscow. The talks covered the upcoming negotiations on conventional forces in Europe as well as new developments in security thinking, East and West. The centerpiece of the week was a seminar jointly sponsored by the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) and the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies (IDDS). Also participating were members of the American Committee on US-Soviet Relations. (See box on page 4) The US participants met separately with senior civilian and military officials of the USSR Foreign Ministry and the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and with senior researchers of the Institute of USA and Canada Studies. (See boxes on pages 6 and 11)*

*The following report summarizes the exchange at the seminar on problems and prospects for conventional force reductions in Europe.*

**T**he East-West military confrontation in Europe is politically obsolete and should be built down." With these words, the former chief US negotiator at the Mutual (and Balanced) Force Reduction (M(B)FR) talks, Jonathan Dean, set the tone for the seminar. Similarly, Soviet participants maintained that NATO and the WTO must strive to "dismantle the offensive core" of their respective military forces. Calling for a nontraditional approach to conventional force reductions, the Soviet seminar co-chair, IMEMO deputy director Oleg Bykov, declared that the current situation is favorable for a breakthrough.

Participants on both sides agreed that the upcoming conventional stability talks (CST) should aim to increase security and stability in Europe, as well as permit cuts in the military spending of both sides. Most individuals at the seminar thought that, in working toward these goals, the talks should produce: (1) commonly-agreed data on the European conventional balance, (2) mutually acceptable procedures for verifying conventional reductions, (3) reductions to equal lower levels of offensive weapons, and (4) some overall further reductions in the forces of East and West. There was less agreement, however, on how quickly the two alliances should try to make deep cuts in conventional forces. Generally, more Soviets than Americans saw rapid progress as possible and necessary.

### Western Concerns

Several US participants noted that many people in the West are not enthusiastic about the forthcoming talks, for various reasons: First, further denuclearization is unlikely until the NATO-WTO ground-force balance—perceived in the West as favoring the WTO—substantially improves. Further, some Western strategists insist that, even if the balance improved, NATO's

current ground forces should not be reduced because, given the length of the borders they must defend, their size is optimal. Significant NATO reductions, they argue, might endanger a key element of the West's strategy—forward defense. Even decidedly asymmetrical cuts favoring the West would not eliminate the need to defend the inter-German border against concentration and breakthrough by WTO troops.

Given these reservations, NATO leaders want to narrow the scope of the new talks. At this stage, they are unwilling to consider substantial NATO reductions in ground or air forces. To create political momentum for reductions, the US delegation members emphasized, negotiators will need to focus on confidence-building initiatives, such as a pullback of some forces stationed in central Europe.

### PRESENTATION OF REDUCTION PROPOSALS

The seminar examined in detail two proposals for reducing conventional forces in Europe—one presented by Ambassador Dean, the other by senior IMEMO scholar Nikolai Kishilov. They also discussed a proposal by Randall Forsberg concerning the kind of data needed to negotiate and verify a significant cut in conventional forces.

#### Dean's Proposal

The objective of Dean's proposal is a 50 percent reduction over ten years in military personnel and offensive weapon systems deployed in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals (ATTU) region. Weapons in six categories would be reduced: tanks, artillery, armored fighting vehicles, armed helicopters, both ground-attack and fighter aircraft, and tactical surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs).

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*Soviet and US analysts confer at IMEMO-IDDS seminar.*



Reductions in personnel would occur in later phases of this process. (For a detailed presentation of Dean's proposal see *DDA* 1:5, July/August 1988.)

### Principal Elements of Dean's Proposal

- At the outset of the negotiations the two sides should furnish detailed data—including locations—covering their air- and ground-unit holdings down to battalion level.
- Early in the process the two sides should establish a Restricted Military Area (RMA) in central Europe. All of the offense-capable weapon systems mentioned above would be excluded from the RMA. Given the unequal operational depth on the two sides, the area should extend 50 km to the west and 100 km to the east of the inter-German border.
- The first phase of reductions should affect all active-duty units in a "central region" including the FRG, France, the Benelux countries, and Denmark in the West, and the GDR, Poland,

Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR western military districts in the East. In addition, a ceiling should be imposed on the number and holdings of reserve units in this area and farther back in the ATTU region.

- The reduction process should begin in the central region with cuts in each weapon category to a level 10 percent below the current level of the side with fewer weapons. Additional cuts of 10 percent should be made every two years. Once the process is underway in the central region, a schedule of similar cuts should follow in the broader Atlantic-to-the-Urals area.
- Reductions should be by units of at least battalion size. Reduced equipment should be destroyed or placed in secured storage. Alternatively, it could replace older equipment held by reserves. Personnel from reduced units should join the remaining active units or reserve units. However, a ceiling should be imposed on each side's total of active and of reserve units.

## IDDS-IMEMO JOINT SEMINAR PARTICIPANTS

### US Delegation Members:

Randall Forsberg, executive director, Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies; board member, Arms Control Association; head of delegation. Ms Forsberg was a staff member of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute from 1968 to 1974.

Ambassador Jonathan Dean (Ret), arms control adviser, Union of Concerned Scientists. Ambassador Dean served as the deputy head of the US delegation to the M(B)FR talks in 1973-1978, and as head of the delegation in 1978-81.

Frank von Hippel, professor of public and international affairs, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University; board member, International Foundation for the Survival and Development of Humanity. Prof von Hippel also chairs the research arm of the Federation of American Scientists.

William Miller, president, American Committee on US-Soviet Relations; president, US branch of the International Foundation for the Survival and Development of Humanity. Mr Miller has served as staff director for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and for the Senate Oversight Committee on Intelligence.

Ambassador Stanley Resor (Ret), partner, Debevoise and Plimpton; board member, Arms Control Association. Ambassador Resor served as US Secretary of the Army in 1965-74, and as head of the US delegation to the M(B)FR talks in 1973-78.

Edward Warner III, Senior Defense Analyst, RAND Corporation. Mr Warner served in 1976-78 as assistant air attache at the US Embassy in Moscow, and in 1978-82 as adviser on strategic weapons and arms control to the US Air Force Chief of Staff.

Also participating in the US delegation were IDDS staff members Alan Bloomgarden, Carl Conetta, and Robert Leavitt.

### Soviet Delegation Members:

Oleg Bykov, deputy director, Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO); co-leader of Soviet delegation.

Alexei Arbatov, head of Department of Disarmament Problems, IMEMO; co-leader of Soviet delegation.

Oleg Amirov, senior research fellow, Department of Disarmament Problems, IMEMO.

Nadezhda Arbatova, senior researcher, Department of West European Studies, IMEMO.

Yuri Fedorov, head of Group on International Security, Department of Disarmament Problems, IMEMO.

Alexander Kalyadin, head of Section on General Disarmament Problems, Department of Disarmament Problems, IMEMO.

Sergei Karaganov, head of department, Institute of Europe.

Nikolai Kishilov, head of Section on Conventional Arms, Department of Disarmament Problems, IMEMO.

Alexander Kislov, deputy director, IMEMO.

Alexander Kokeev, senior research fellow, Department of West European Studies, IMEMO.

Gennady Kolosov, senior research fellow, Department of West European Studies, IMEMO.

Alexander Konovalov, head of Section on General Purpose Forces, Department of Military-political Affairs, Institute of USA and Canada Studies.

Vasily Krivokhizha, senior research fellow, Department on Military-political Affairs, Institute of USA and Canada Studies.

Vladimir Kulagin, deputy director, Research Coordination Center, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Major General Vadim Makarevsky (Ret), senior research fellow, Department of Disarmament Problems, IMEMO.

Valery Mazing, senior research fellow, Department of Military-Political Affairs, Institute of USA and Canada Studies.

Alexander Saveliev, head of Group on Assessment and Forecasting, Department of Disarmament Problems, IMEMO.

Yuri Streltsov, senior research fellow, Department of Disarmament Problems, IMEMO.

Vladimir Yerofeev, senior research fellow, Institute of Europe.

Also participating in the Soviet delegation were IMEMO researchers Vladimir Frangoulov, Igor Kobozev, and Yuri Usachev.

### Special Problems: Surface-to-Surface Missiles and Aircraft

- Reductions of tactical surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) should be negotiated in separate US-USSR talks. The goal should be a ceiling for each side of 300 SSMs with a range under 50 km. Both sides should be free to arm these missiles with any mix they choose of nuclear and conventional warheads. Broader East-West talks on tactical nuclear reductions could also be initiated.
- The CST negotiations should cover all aircraft assigned to the central front—including Soviet interceptors and some US-based aircraft. To compensate NATO for the difficulty of transatlantic reinforcement and for the WTO's large air defense force, some US aircraft assigned to NATO should be exempt from reductions.

### Verification Regime and Confidence-building Measures

- In addition to "national technical means" of verification, major emphasis should be placed on direct inspection as well as over-flights of military units, repair and production sites, and designated storage areas. The latter should be constantly monitored by means of on-site sensors.
- An annual inspection quota should be negotiated. In the first phase, 400-500 inspections per alliance per year should be sufficient.
- The two sides should furnish frequently updated data on the numbers, weapon holdings, and location of controlled units.
- The two sides should negotiate additional confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) that place permanent observers at reduction-zone exit and entry points, ports, border crossings, traffic chokepoints, division headquarters, and airfields.

### The IMEMO Proposal

Dr Nikolai Kishilov, head of the conventional arms section of the IMEMO Disarmament Department, discussed the proposal published in IMEMO's 1987 *Disarmament and Security Yearbook*. Kishilov said the proposal, although unofficial, illustrates the kind of agreement required to lessen the dangers of surprise attack, eliminate asymmetries in the two sides' offensive forces, and achieve meaningful bilateral reductions. (For official NATO and WTO positions, see box on page 8.)

### Focus, Scope, and Means of Reduction

Like Dean, Kishilov stressed that the negotiations should focus on reducing personnel, units, and offense-oriented weaponry—including tanks, artillery, tactical missiles, and land-based strike-aircraft. Unlike Dean, however, Kishilov also suggested reductions in some naval strike aircraft. Reductions should cover active-duty divisional and nondivisional units—those comparable in readiness to Soviet category 1 and 2 units. The equipment withdrawn should be destroyed, reassigned for civilian use (if possible), or placed in secured, monitored storage facilities.

The IMEMO proposal suggests cutting personnel early in the reduction process where Dean proposed waiting until a later stage.

### Reduction and Disengagement Zones

In the IMEMO concept, the Atlantic-to-the-Urals reduction area is subdivided into three concentric zones subject to weapon withdrawal schedules that could either succeed one another or



*Ambassador Stanley Resor (Ret) presenting a proposal. Ambassador Jonathan Dean (Ret) and RAND analyst Edward Warner look on.*

overlap. The first zone includes the FRG, the Benelux countries, and Denmark in the West, and the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary in the East. Measures implemented in this zone should include:

- Creation of a "disengagement zone" between NATO and WTO forces, extending 100 km on both sides of the inter-German border. The more maneuverable and offense-capable weapons of each side—including armed helicopters, tactical attack-aircraft, and tactical missiles—should be withdrawn from this zone. Tactical nuclear weapons should be excluded from a somewhat wider zone of 150 km on each side.
- Reduction in the number of combat-ready units within the first zone to a level 40 percent below the current number on the side with fewer units, and reduction of offensive arms and equipment (tanks, artillery, mortars, and multiple-launch rocket systems) to a level 50 percent below the current level of the side with fewer.

Along with the first-zone areas, the second zone should incorporate the United Kingdom and France, as well as the six NATO-designated reinforcement divisions based in the United States. To the East, the second zone should add to the first the USSR's Baltic, Byelorussian, and Carpathian border districts. The measures implemented in this larger second zone should include:

- Reduction in the number of combat-ready units by 25 percent to equal lower levels;
- Reduction of offensive arms and equipment by 30 percent to equal lower levels.

The third zone should incorporate all the remaining European NATO countries and parts of the United States. To the east, it should include Romania, Bulgaria, and the remaining eight European military districts in the USSR west of the Urals. In addition, the measures implemented in this zone should apply to the US marines deployed in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. The measures implemented in the third zone should include:

- Reduction by 10 percent to equal lower levels in the number of combat-ready units;
- Reduction by 15 percent to equal lower levels of offensive arms and equipment, including both land- and sea-based strike

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aircraft (fighters, ground-attack planes, interceptors, and non-strategic bombers).

Of the two proposals, IMEMO's calls for less ambitious cuts, except in its first zone (identical to Dean's "central region" minus France and the Western military districts of the USSR). However, where Dean suggests implementing his 50 percent cuts in phases stretched over a decade, and views the creation of a disengagement zone as a distinct step preceding reductions, the IMEMO proposal calls for establishing a disengagement zone simultaneously with reductions and suggests implementing its "more modest" cuts in a single phase.

The IMEMO proposal also differs from Dean's in proposing to count in the reduction process some US-based army personnel and Atlantic- and Mediterranean-based marine units. In addition, IMEMO suggests reducing holdings of naval tactical aircraft (an area of Western strength), but overlooks interceptors (an area of Soviet strength). The IMEMO proposal does not compensate NATO for the difficulty of transferring US-based aircraft across the Atlantic, nor does it take into account the WTO's superiority in air defense.

Both proposals call for an offensive-weapon withdrawal zone, but Dean wants an asymmetrical one where IMEMO wants a

symmetrical one. The IMEMO proposal also calls for a nuclear weapon free zone, which Dean avoids.

### **Data Requirements**

Kishilov agreed with Dean on the importance of the two sides exchanging data on conventional forces before the talks begin. Kishilov suggested that this data contain the number of active and reserve divisions in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals area, and specify their holdings in tanks, artillery, large mortars (over 100 mm), infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), and attack aircraft. For the first reduction zone, details should be furnished on the number, location, and arms holdings of units down to battalion size.

## **DISCUSSION OF THE PROPOSALS**

### **On Nuclear and Naval Forces**

Although generally enthusiastic about Dean's proposal, several Soviets said that it did not adequately cover tactical nuclear weapons. These, they said, are the single most dangerous offensive element in Europe. One Soviet analyst argued, "There cannot be nonprovocative defense unless there is also denuclearization."

Several US participants reiterated that NATO is unlikely to

## **FOLLOW-UP MEETING WITH MILITARY ADVISERS TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE**

Some participants in the IDDS-IMEMO joint seminar met later in the week with high-ranking military advisers to the Central Committee of the Communist Party to assess prospects for the upcoming negotiations on European conventional forces. The following are highlights of the meeting:

■ The Soviet participants agreed with the Americans that data should be exchanged before beginning the negotiations; and, they concurred that information on the location and weapon holdings of units is necessary for verification purposes. Could data be exchanged on forces other than those to be reduced or before the two sides reach agreement on what forces to reduce? According to the Soviet officers, these options are negotiable.

■ The Soviets were open to considering a variety of intrusive verification measures—including zonal overflights and the stationing of permanent observers at critical locations.

■ The Soviets stressed the need for a comprehensive approach to arms reductions and constraints. They pointed out that the Soviet Union had agreed to set aside the problem of controlling naval forces during the first round of CSBM talks at the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE). But now, they said, the problem must be addressed in some forum. As for aircraft, they argued that all ground-attack planes should be included in the conventional force talks. The Soviets assured the US delegation that on the Soviet side this would mean including all bombers except those having a strategic role.

■ Even the initial step in the reduction process should entail significant cuts on both sides, the Soviets emphasized. Neither the establishment of a disengagement zone nor the resolution of military asymmetries between the two sides should be seen

as a distinct step preceding mutual reductions.

One Soviet official proposed reductions in three steps: (1) eliminating asymmetries and making some substantial bilateral cuts; (2) reducing the remaining forces bilaterally down to about 50 percent of current levels; (3) lowering force levels further to a point where little or no offensive capability would remain on either side. "This," he declared, "is the way to security in Europe."

The Soviets were reluctant to incorporate "sub-phases" within the steps. A member of the US delegation mentioned the Soviet offer to cut 20,000 tanks if the West cut 1400 strike aircraft. Would the Soviets carry out this trade-off in a single step? "Sure, why not," one Soviet replied.

■ To questions from Americans about controlling reserve forces, one adviser responded that the possibility of ceilings or reductions of reserves was open. At any rate, the Soviets would furnish information on the size and weapon holdings of their reserves.

■ The US delegation suggested that the Soviet Union could help build political momentum for the talks by taking some unilateral steps prior to the talks. Among those mentioned were (1) early presentation of data on Soviet forces; (2) permission for the Western side to conduct surveillance flights over the WTO border region; (3) Modest withdrawals from the "zone of contact" between the two alliances. To this suggestion one Soviet replied that the WTO had made several unilateral initiatives in the past, but that the West had failed to reciprocate. Both sides needed to face the problem of building and maintaining political momentum, he insisted. Nevertheless, "These steps must be considered."



agree to further denuclearization at this time, but pointed out that Dean's proposal addresses Soviet concerns in several ways. First, it calls for reductions in dual-capable aircraft. Second, it proposes to limit nuclear-capable, surface-to-surface missiles in separate talks.

Several Soviet attendees raised the question of controlling naval arms, especially sea-launched cruise-missiles, which are nuclear-capable and have ground-attack missions. Seminar participants generally agreed that in the short-term, the best forum for negotiating constraints on naval forces would be the second Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), due to begin in early 1989 in parallel with the CST talks. The Soviets emphasized the importance of the two alliances seriously examining in some forum the whole range of issues raised by naval forces.

### On Aircraft

The Soviets underscored the importance of reducing tactical attack aircraft, arguing that the West has a notable advantage in that area. Soviet officials have estimated that NATO's numerical superiority in "strike aircraft" totals 1400 planes. (See "The Soviet Proposal for European Security" by Soviet Defense Minister Dmitri Yazov, in the September 1988 *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*.) Some seminar participants argued that *all* aircraft slated for use in Europe, including those based in the United States, should be "controlled." However, this need not mean reducing US-based aircraft. "Control" could simply entail counting relevant US-based planes in the NATO total that would be used in negotiating reductions to take place in the European theater.

Several US delegation members questioned the Soviet estimate of a sizable NATO advantage in tactical aircraft. They contended that if Soviet interceptors are counted, the NATO numerical advantage disappears. Although they conceded that NATO has an edge in technology, they stressed that the WTO has an offsetting edge in ground-based air defense and a much larger force of interceptor aircraft.

Dean reminded the participants of the possible compromise contained in his proposal: the talks should cover *all* tactical aircraft slated for use in a European war, including those based in the United States and those designated "interceptors" on the WTO side. The balance of air power should then be adjusted to correct for the WTO's superior air defenses and the difficulty of reinforcing NATO with US-based planes.

The Soviet analysts disagreed among themselves about the value of reducing interceptors. Some insisted that such aircraft serve the defense and should not be reduced. Others pointed out that interceptors can play a supporting role in an offensive air strike or can even be reconfigured for a limited ground attack role.

There were also disagreements about reductions in combat helicopters. Some participants said they are important antitank assets and should not be subject to major cuts. Those who advocated reductions in helicopters differed with one another. Should limits and reductions apply only to *armed* helicopters as initially suggested in the Western nonoffensive defense literature, or should all *armored* helicopters also be subject to cuts—even if unarmed and used for transport rather than ground attack? Several analysts noted that unarmed, armored helicopters can easily be modified for ground-attack missions by adding weapons.

Throughout the dialogue about air and naval forces, the US

delegation conveyed the West's current reluctance to negotiate cuts in those areas. But both Dean and Forsberg concurred with the Soviets that power projection and deep strike forces are destabilizing and should eventually be eliminated worldwide.



*Soviet analysts listen to US response to IMEMO proposal.*

### Reserves and Rapid Reinforcement

Forsberg pointed out that many people in the West fear that, should an East-West conventional war occur, the WTO might be able to outmobilize NATO during the critical first 50 days. To remove this potential advantage, she noted, NATO planners will undoubtedly want to limit the WTO's reserve forces.

In contrast, several Soviet analysts argued that mobilization capability beyond the first few weeks is not an issue, since neither side would initiate a war requiring more than a few weeks to win. They saw preemption and surprise-attack capabilities as posing much more serious threats to stability. The "short war" assumption was also evident in reports of the computerized war-modeling that IMEMO undertakes to test stability, in which researchers confine their modeling to the first two weeks of war.

Nevertheless, participants from both sides assessed measures that would alleviate Western fears about long-term mobilization. They agreed that ceilings could be placed on the number and strength of reserve units, that some reserve equipment could put into secured storage, and that in the longer term, cuts in reserve units might be negotiated.

### Disposition of Withdrawn Equipment

Related to the issue of mobilization and reinforcement is the question of what happens to weaponry withdrawn from a reduction zone? If it is simply moved to an uncontrolled area in the rear, it could be rapidly reintroduced into the zone in a crisis. Although many participants believed the best solution would be to destroy such equipment, they also explored the two other main options: transporting withdrawn equipment back to the United States or behind the Urals, or partially dismantling it and placing it in secured storage.

### Controlling Production

Some US delegation members expressed concern about the production of controlled weapons that would continue within the

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reduction zones. Even if the new weapons were designated for use outside the zone or for permitted modernization within it, they could obviously be redirected at short notice. In other words, such facilities raise the possibility of a sudden "breakout" from the reduction regime.

Again, the seminar explored several measures that might lessen the problem. First, to ease the task of verifiably limiting arsenals within the zones, production numbers could be reported and new equipment stored and secured near the production sites. Second, to facilitate tracking new equipment as it is transferred from production sites, both sides could be required to specify the eventual destination of each major system.

### **A Restricted Military Area (RMA)**

Seminar participants concurred that establishing the Restricted Military Area proposed by Dean would do much to reduce risk and build confidence. One Soviet analyst contended that such a zone would help create the political conditions needed to negotiate substantial reductions.

However, another Soviet noted that there is a trade-off between the political feasibility of disengagement zones and their military significance. Although a zone extending 150 km to the east of the central front might be meaningful militarily, creating it would be politically difficult because it implies a virtually complete Soviet withdrawal from the GDR. At any rate, establishing such a zone would afford defenders only 24 additional hours of warning in the event of an attack.

For these reasons many participants thought that disengagement zones should be viewed more as a means to increase trust and confidence than to reduce vulnerability to surprise attack. Further, some thought that to facilitate reaching agreement on an RMA, the width and measures to be implemented should be less ambitious than Dean's.

### **A Modified RMA**

The possibility of a "tank thin-out zone" in central Europe was advanced by one Soviet participant, who felt it might be easier to negotiate than a zone from which all offensive arms are excluded. He pointed out that a thin-out zone could achieve defensive restructuring if armored and mechanized infantry divisions in the zone were stripped of several tank battalions, and if bridging equipment and ammunition, fuel, and spare part supplies were withdrawn.

One US delegation member offered another possibility: all offensive arms in the zone could be reduced by 50 percent and the excluded weapons moved a great distance from the zone. He argued that such measures would strongly undercut both the capability for surprise attack and for rapid reinforcement. At the same time, he argued, they might be more feasible politically than Dean's RMA because they would involve less ambitious withdrawals.

Soviet participants were not immediately prepared to accept the idea of a restricted military area extending farther to the East than to the West. When Americans stressed that such an asymmetry was necessary to allay NATO's anxiety about its lack of operational depth, Soviet analysts responded that the West had planned its deployments to compensate for this problem—for instance, by assigning ground missions to naval aircraft. In their view, the issue of operational depth could only be understood and

*Continued on next page.*

## **LIKELY OPENING PROPOSALS AT THE UPCOMING CONVENTIONAL ARMS TALKS**

Based on recent statements and documents, following is a summary of what each side is likely to propose.

### **NATO:**

■ Highly asymmetric cuts in troops and in weapons essential for surprise attack: main-battle tanks (MBTs), 100 mm and larger artillery, armored infantry vehicles, and bridging equipment. Reduction targets should be set for both the central region and Europe as a whole. According to a suggestive draft proposal developed by the FRG defense ministry, first-phase reduction targets in the central region should be common NATO and WTO levels 5% below the current NATO levels in each category. Comparable cuts in military personnel should be made.

Based on NATO estimates, the WTO would need to remove 25,000 MBTs, 22,000 artillery pieces, 11,000 armored personnel carriers (APCs), and 220,000 troops; while NATO would remove 800 MBTs, 400 artillery pieces, 400 APCs, and 9,000 troops. Thus, most critically, NATO wants each side's European tank force to number no more than 20,000 and for the Soviets' share of the WTO force not to exceed 12,000.

■ Concentration of the initial cuts in "stationed forces"—those not indigenous to the country in which they are stationed.

■ Ceilings on the forces of individual nations so that none would have more than (1) 30 percent of the European total in any offensive weapon category, (2) 30 percent of any central region total, or (3) 10-30 percent of any total held by stationed forces in the central region.

■ Exemption of combat aircraft from reduction, at least until a second phase, and of naval forces indefinitely.

### **WTO:**

■ In the first phase, bilateral reductions designed to correct asymmetries, and in later phases, to remove the "offensive core" of both sides' forces. One possible initial reduction would eliminate 20,000 Warsaw Pact MBTs and 1,400 NATO tactical aircraft. A target ceiling for reduction should be set for each class of offensive weapons—a percentage of the lower of the two current levels in the class—and for each of two or three concentric zones. The earliest and most radical cuts should be made in the inner zone containing the central front. The weapon cuts should be followed by troop cuts of 100,000 to 150,000 over one to two years and then of about 25 percent of the remaining forces over the next five to seven years.

■ Inclusion particularly of tactical aircraft, but of other dual-capable weapons as well, in first-phase reductions.



settled by examining all the forces contributing to the conventional balance in Europe—including air and naval units.

### Data Needs

The US and Soviet delegations agreed fully on the need for an early exchange of data—preferably before the talks begin—to avoid the M(B)FR experience of becoming bogged down in data disputes. Seminar participants felt that only with access to good data provided “up front” will negotiators be able to identify asymmetries and put a high priority on cutting those force that contribute most to the danger of surprise attack.

But can the two sides furnish data before agreeing on the categories of weapons to be reduced? If they supply preliminary data on all potentially relevant units and weapons, that might imply that all forces are subject to reductions—a position currently unacceptable to both sides. To sidestep this dilemma, US participant Stanley Resor suggested that each side “nominate” forces and weapon systems as candidates for reduction, and then supply data on all items nominated by either side. Both sides would, however, accept that exchanging data on a category does not constitute an agreement to negotiate reductions in it.

There was a lively discussion and some disagreement on the types of data to be exchanged. Each side should set a high standard, Randall Forsberg suggested, by furnishing detailed information on its own forces. She proposed that, to facilitate negotiating reductions (not just withdrawals from the front), the data include numbers of weapons specified by model and role. Negotiators will also need to know whether equipment is in active or reserve units, or in spare storage. Finally, Forsberg strongly argued that weapon totals should be provided both globally and by the country or Soviet military district of deployment. The data must meet these criteria, she said, if the two sides are to negotiate and verify “cuts and limits, withdrawals, limited demobilizations, ceilings, and major reductions.”

All present agreed that publishing data to Forsberg’s standards would greatly facilitate negotiating deep cuts; but analysts on both sides contended that the effort to compile detailed global data would face too many political obstacles and take too long. Some of the Americans were willing to accept less data on some reserve units, and forego data for global forces and data broken down by model in exchange for base-by-base totals within central Europe.

Forsberg responded that by omitting data on reserves and global force deployments, the two sides would limit the agenda of the talks to regional withdrawals. Real reductions in force levels, judged globally, would be unlikely. Further, since it would be impossible to control the growth of reserves, fears of longterm mobilization would remain or even increase. Others argued that the current focus should, nevertheless, be on short-notice and surprise attack capabilities; global cuts could come later.

The seminar discussion moved toward a possible solution to the dilemma: require varying levels of detail for active and reserve forces, for different zones, and at different stages of the reduction process. At first, highly localized information—including the location and holdings of units down to the battalion level but excluding specific weapon models—might be provided only for active-duty forces in the forward areas. As the reduction process proceeds, experience and confidence would increase, making it easier and more feasible to supply detailed data for more forces deployed in a broader area.

### Verification

A surprising level of consensus emerged about the need for stringent, intrusive means of verifying withdrawals from the front. Most participants felt that the extensive verification measures outlined by Dean, although ambitious, would be workable. One Soviet participant pointed out that implementing Dean’s verification regime would give some military personnel a role to play after reductions release them from combat units. The Americans indicated that, in a reversal of traditional roles, some Western nations might be less willing than their Eastern counterparts to permit verification overflights and intrusive inspections.

### Confidence- and Security-building Measures

Toward the end of the seminar, participants turned to the question of new confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) that could complement the CST reductions. One Soviet analyst suggested that a future European CSBM regime should not only help diminish the risk of surprise attack and unintended conflict, but also facilitate the transition to defense-oriented force structures. Further, he said, it should constrain the full range of military activities including naval, air, and amphibious operations, as well as, preparations for ground warfare.

Dean observed that in the short-term the best confidence-building measures are a good data exchange and a good verification regime. He suggested establishing a jointly run center for verification that could also assist in crisis reduction activities and offer a forum in which to examine military doctrine.

### Conclusion

Alexei Arbatov briefly summarized the major points of agreement that emerged during the seminar. First, he said, the two blocs should aim to reduce forces in Europe—personnel and offensive weaponry—to equal ceilings below either side’s current level. Second, to guarantee increased military stability, the reductions should be accompanied by some defensive restructuring. Third, accurate, detailed data are vital to the success of the talks. Fourth, the two sides need to reach a more precise and shared understanding of the offense-defense distinction. Fifth, negotiators should divide the Atlantic-to-the-Urals reduction area into sub-zones and develop measures appropriate to each. Finally, establishing a modest “restricted military area” or exclusionary zone might be an effective early confidence-building measure. □

### THE GORBACHEV PLAN

On 7 December 1988 General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev announced these unilateral Soviet withdrawals in Europe (quoted from the *New York Times*, 9 December 1988):

- “Of the estimated 10,000 Soviet tanks in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, 5,000 would be withdrawn, along with 50,000 men.
- “In the European part of the Soviet Union, 5,000 tanks would be cut.
- “Of the total Soviet forces from the Atlantic to the Urals, 800 combat aircraft and 8,500 artillery systems would be cut.”

forces on each side by the number of days, weeks, or months it would take to get them to battlefield. By this standard, Soviet phantom divisions would drop back into the column of forces available only after many months, while US units with armaments prepositioned in Europe (divisions not mentioned anywhere in the NATO report) would be counted along with those available on each side in a matter of days or weeks.

### Rebasing or Demobilizing?

To date, neither side appears to have grasped the full potential of the CST talks for going beyond troop withdrawals from Europe to actual demobilization of a large fraction of the conventional forces on each side. If the forces withdrawn from Europe are *rebased* in the United States or behind the Urals, there would be no reduction in military spending or in either side's capability for wartime mobilization. In fact, military-related spending would probably rise, due to the costs of relocating units, building new bases, and verifying the agreement.

Only *demobilizing* the forces withdrawn from the ATTU

region will lead to real reductions in military spending and a reduction in the capability for longer-term mobilization. A reasonable goal for demobilization would be a 50 percent cut over the next decade in all forces maintained to deter or fight a war in Europe. To assess this or any other CST negotiating proposal with respect to its impact on overall readiness and spending, negotiators must count not just the forces deployed in the ATTU region, but all forces deployed worldwide by all NATO and WTO nations. Only a global baseline can ensure that the forces withdrawn from Europe are actually demobilized, not just rebased.

At a time when US allies are refusing to increase their contributions to "burden-sharing" and when the US deficit is financed in significant part by borrowing from those allies, this country should jump at the chance to reduce the risk of war while saving \$75 billion annually through bilateral East-West cuts in conventional forces. This means that NATO must take the CST talks seriously and challenge the Soviets to live up to their word—not delay reductions with proposals that are militarily absurd, or obscure this historic opportunity with misleading statistics on the conventional balance. □

## REPORT ON MOSCOW IGCC CONFERENCE, 2-8 OCTOBER 1988

Three weeks after the IDDS-IMEMO seminar a similar group of US and Soviet arms control specialists and policymakers engaged in a related dialogue. Co-sponsored by the University of California's Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) and the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation, the conference probed many of the same issues raised during the earlier seminar.

Western participants included former Ambassador Jonathan Dean; secretary general of the North Atlantic Assembly, Peter Corterier; IGCC associate director, Allen Greb; the former commander-in-chief of the US Army in Europe General Glenn Otis; US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency representative John Gunderson; and University of Copenhagen professor, Anders Boserup. Among the Soviet participants were Lieutenant-General Victor Starodubov, aide to the International Department of the Communist Party's Central Committee; Ambassador-at-large OA Grinevsky; Vladimir Shustov and Vladimir Kulganin of the Foreign Ministry; Alexei Arbatov, head of IMEMO's Department of Disarmament and International Security; and Sergei Karaganov, department head at the Institute of European Studies.

### Highlights

- Several Soviets asserted that current Soviet policy assumes strong US political, economic, and military engagement in Europe—though at a reduced force level—and that this is preferable to US isolationism.
- Leading Soviets proposed that armaments in Europe be reduced by 50 percent and they insisted that bilateral cuts be made right from the start. The West must make real cuts to justify asymmetrical reductions by the WTO, they argued. A good first step would be to reduce both the personnel and arms of the five NATO divisions in the FRG and the 15 WTO divisions in the GDR and Czechoslovakia.

- Several Soviets proposed that the Atlantic-to-Urals area be divided into northern, central, and southern reduction zones. They expressed little interest in a single, undifferentiated reduction zone.

- A number of Soviets suggested that initial reductions could be made in a zone extending 150 km on *each* side of the frontline, with monitoring by low-flying aircraft. However, there were conflicting Soviet responses to Dean's suggestion that, to allow for the lack of operational depth in the West, the zone should extend 50 km to the NATO side and 100-150 km to the WTO side. One Soviet reiterated that the width of the zone must be equal on both sides, but another believed the Soviet general staff might accept unequal widths.

- Members of both the Western and Soviet groups wanted verification dealt with from the outset of the new conventional force negotiations—not at the end.

- Pointing to the historical role of tactical aircraft in Blitzkrieg assaults, the Soviets insisted that tactical air as well as ground forces be reduced. One leading Soviet called for cuts in ground-attack aircraft—whether designated for use against line-of-battle or rear-area targets—and in planes with both ground-attack and fighter capability. However, he argued that reconnaissance, transport, and strictly counter-air aircraft (interceptors) should be excluded from the talks. Reduced aircraft should be destroyed or placed in secure storage.

- Some Soviets also wanted a ban on tactical surface-to-surface missiles and tactical missile defenses.

- The Soviets underscored the need to control naval and air activities through new CSBMs to be negotiated in the second CDE.

- Some Soviet support was expressed for two other CSBMs: establishing an East-West risk-reduction center in Europe, and withdrawing major ammunition and other stocks from the central front.

# The Rise of the *Institutchiki*

by Edward L Warner III

"Ted" Warner, a former US Air Force colonel, is a senior defense analyst at the RAND Corporation office in Washington DC. The following is an excerpt from a paper by Warner presented at a 19-21 June 1988 workshop on "Assessing European Security under Gorbachev," sponsored by the Aspen Strategy Group and European Security Group.

The recent ferment in Moscow regarding fundamental directions in Soviet national security policy has a very important organizational dimension. Over the past 50 years the professional military establishment has been solely responsible for the development and analysis of proposals regarding various aspects of the Soviet defense effort. The senior civilian leaders who sit on the Politburo have, of course, long made the decisions about the magnitude of the defense budget, the size and structure of the armed forces, and the content of Soviet military doctrine. But the alternatives from which the Politburo has been able to choose have long been developed and analyzed by the "brain" of the Soviet military establishment, the

General Staff. Developments in Moscow over the past several years, which are being accelerated by the ongoing debates over "reasonable sufficiency" and the character of future Soviet defense policy, have begun to challenge this long-standing process.

The 1980s have witnessed the emergence of a group of civilian national security specialists—"institutchiki"—with apparently growing ambitions to play a significant role in shaping Soviet military policy. They work largely within the framework of the USSR Academy of Sciences, in particular at its leading foreign affairs institutes in Moscow—the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) and the Institute for United States and Canada Studies. This group comprises veteran civilian academics and retired military officers such as Evgeny Primakov, Vitaly Zhurkin, Alexei Vasilyev, Roald Sagdeyev, Yevgeny Velikov, Lt General Mikhail Milstein (Ret), and Major General Vadim Makarevsky (Ret), as well as a rising new civilian generation, including Andrei Kokoshin, Alexei Arbatov, Andrei Kor-tunov, and Igor Malashenko.

*Continued on next page.*

### CIVILIAN ANALYSTS ENTER THE DEBATE ON SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE

According to Andrei Kokoshin, director of the USSR's Institute for USA and Canada Studies, a "great debate" on Soviet conventional military doctrine has begun, involving the military establishment and, for the first time, civilian defense analysts. Actually, two debates are in progress—one raising questions about the overarching goal of defense policy, the other focusing on the way the Red Army would defend the Soviet Union from aggression.

General Secretary Gorbachev gave a powerful impetus to the debate on overall defense policy in January 1986 when, addressing the 27th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, he advanced a new concept to guide defense planning: reasonable sufficiency. The WTO Political Consultative Committee amplified the call for doctrinal change at its 1986 and 1987 meetings. In Budapest in 1986, it proposed that both East and West work toward eliminating their capacity for surprise attack and large-scale offensive operations. The following year in Berlin it declared that military doctrine should be geared to "war prevention," not the traditional "victory in war."

In Kokoshin's view, these statements signal a revolution in military doctrine—a revolution whose aim is greater security and stability at much lower than current force levels. But, he quickly adds, it has taken two years for those statements to stimulate work and debate on new military operational concepts and structures.

Parallel to the larger doctrinal debate has been a reassessment within the Soviet military establishment of how it handled the first phase of the 1941 Nazi invasion of the Soviet

Union. Critics have argued that the Red Army was insufficiently prepared to fight defensively. According to Kokoshin, this discussion has recently generated articles in leading military journals on the importance of defensive operations, the need to increase the army's capacity for such operations, and the potential applicability of some nonoffensive defense concepts.

In 1987 Kokoshin co-authored an article with a retired military officer, V Larionov, linking the issues raised in the two debates. "The Battle of Kursk from the Standpoint of Defensive Doctrine" (*World Economy and International Affairs*, August 1987) uses the experience of the pivotal Second World War battle to illustrate the powerful role defensive operations can play in defeating aggression and to suggest that defensive restructuring by NATO and the WTO would greatly enhance European stability. Larionov, who in the 1960s helped ghost-write the classic *Soviet Military Strategy*, is now working on a new book, *On the Defensive*, that explores defensive combat.

Together these debates are leading a growing number of military and political policymakers to recognize the need for an increased emphasis on defensive forces. However, IMEMO Senior Research Fellow Major General Vadim Makarevsky (Ret) notes that there will be a substantial time lag between revising doctrine and actually implementing new forms of military organization, deployment, and training. Further, as researchers at both IMEMO and the USA-Canada Institute acknowledge, a key question that continues to rivet Soviet policymakers is: How far down the path of defensive restructuring can the Soviet Union go, if it must go alone?



The civilians active in these efforts have acquired their expertise in contemporary defense matters largely through their involvement over the past 10 to 15 years in the study of Western defense policies and of arms control issues generally. Their involvement in the latter has increased substantially over the past decade due to their participation in a new series of studies, produced first under the aegis of the Scientific Research Council on Problems of Peace and Disarmament (established in 1979) and later under the Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace and Against the Nuclear Threat (formed in May 1983).

Until very recently, these civilian specialists concentrated on the analysis of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive forces, an area where useful analysis can be carried out without an extensive background in military affairs. They have, for example, produced credible studies of strategic stability between the superpowers under various strategic force-reduction configurations and of US-Soviet arms interactions should the United States deploy a space-based ballistic-missile defense system.

Over the past year, the *Institutchiki* have begun to turn their attention to the analysis of theater ground-force operations as well, an area where the Soviet military has long enjoyed a monopoly of expertise. Due to the inherent complexities of theater warfare analysis, useful studies of alternative convention-

al force postures will certainly be more difficult for the civilian specialists to carry out. The Soviet General Staff is unlikely to look favorably on the prospect of receiving analytical assistance from civilians on military operational matters, particularly concerning theater warfare.

One should, of course, not overstate the significance of these developments. The professional military establishment apparently continues to maintain control over detailed information on Soviet and foreign military forces and remains the primary formulator of the military-technical side of Soviet military doctrine. Moreover, the General Staff reportedly provides analytical support to the Defense Council, the subcommittee of the Politburo responsible for defense matters. Nevertheless, Mikhail Gorbachev is strongly challenging prevailing security concepts and encouraging innovative thinking about these matters. The Politburo member currently responsible for international affairs, Alexander Yakovlev, has called for an increased role by civilian international affairs specialists and natural scientists in the analysis of foreign and defense issues—as did his predecessor, Anatoly Dobrynin. A group of talented and ambitious Soviet civilian academics appears to be stepping forward to accept this invitation. □



Soviet citizens gather to read a display copy of Moscow News—the “voice of perestroika” (restructuring).

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